• The intended parents must bring the application within six months of the birth of the child.
10
• The child must live with the intended parents, either or both of whom must be domiciled in the UK.
11
5 This does not mean that a single parent can never be recognised following surrogacy. It would still be possible for a single parent to seek an adoption order. However, this is a longer and more complex route compared to a section 54 order, which is the most appropriate and streamlined route in cases of surrogacy. 6 A Inglis, "Hagar's baby: surrogacy arrangements" (2014) SLT (News) 105. 7 1996 SLT 1387. 8 S 54 (1). 9 S 54 (2). 10 S 54 (3).
• The birth mother (and any other legal parent) must freely give informed consent to the order unless they cannot be found or are incapable of agreeing.
13
• The birth mother's consent must be given more than six weeks after birth.
14
• There must not have been the exchange of any payment beyond reasonable expenses, unless authorised by the court.
15
These requirements can be divided into two categories. Firstly, there are those requirements that seem to afford the courts some discretion in how they are applied. These include determining whether a relationship is an enduring family one, determining whether it is possible for the mother to give consent and determining whether a payment exceeds reasonable expenses and, if so, whether to authorise it anyway. The remaining requirements do not seem to afford the courts any discretion. These include the requirement that one of the applicants is the child's genetic parents, that there must be two applicants, that they must be over eighteen and that the application must be brought within six months.
Claire Fenton-Glynn has correctly observed that the approach taken by the courts in England & Wales to the interpretation of a number of these requirements is one "in which the law has been stretched and manipulated to fit the requirements of justice". welfare of the child the court's paramount consideration when deciding whether or not to make a parental order. As a result, the courts have authorised payments that clearly exceed reasonable expenses 18 and dispensed with the consent of the birth mother despite concerns 11 Section 54(4). 12 Section 54(5). 13 Section 54(6) and (7). 14 Section 54(7 Act 1989 for residence of the child it became clear that neither of the intended parents were legal parents as they had never sought a parental order. In a previous High Court case, Hedley J had described the six-month time limit as 'non-extendable.' 26 That decision applied the clear language of the statute and was followed in subsequent cases. 27 Despite this, the President in Re X held that section 54(3) did not prevent the court from making a parental order beyond the six-month time limit and in that case found that the welfare of the child required the court to make the order.
28
In support of his decision Munby P reasoned as follows:
Can Parliament really have intended that the gate should be barred forever if the application for a parental order is lodged even one day late? I cannot think so. Parliament has not explained its thinking, but given the transcendental importance of a parental order, with its consequences stretching many, many decades into the future, can it sensibly be thought that Parliament intended the difference between six months and six months and one day to be determinative and one day's delay to be fatal? I assume that Parliament intended a sensible through an adoption agency. : "Adoption is not an attractive solution given the commissioning father's existing biological relationship with X. As X's guardian put it, a parental order presents the optimum legal and psychological solution for X and is preferable to an adoption order because it confirms the important legal, practical and psychological reality of X's identity: the commissioning father is his biological father and all parties intended from the outset that the commissioning parents should be his legal parents". 24 Munby P's reasoning here relies heavily on the nature of a parental order and the effect it has on all the parties. Given this, the court was permitted, and required in the interests of child welfare, to make a parental order despite the expiration of the time limit. Furthermore, Munby J held that even if the statutory provision could not ordinarily bear such an interpretation, it should be read down in accordance with the Human Rights Act 1998, given the fundamental importance of a parental order to the child. He noted that "section 54 goes to the most fundamental aspects of status and, transcending even status, to the very identity of the child as a human being: who he is and who his parents are. It is central to his being, whether as an individual or as a member of his family".
30

D. CONCLUSION
As a number of the judges involved in these surrogacy cases have recognised, the status of legal parenthood is of fundamental importance to both parents and children. Therefore, the courts' ability to make parental orders should be governed by the best interests of all involved. This must include and perhaps even prioritise the welfare of the child, established in a relational context as part of a family. 31 It is arguable that legislative reform is the ideal remedy for deficiencies in legislation that prevent parental orders being granted where all parties consent. It is, therefore, encouraging that the Law Commission might examine this area of law. However, given that the courts have breached a 'bright line' rule (in relation to the six month time limit) it remains unclear why, and unfortunate that, they did not pursue a similarly just result in Re Z by creating the facility for full single parenthood by surrogacy. 
